Rhetoric Meets Reality

Outgoing NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted at a Wilson Center event in June that “the growing alignment between Russia and its authoritarian friends in Asia makes it even more important that we work closely with our friends in the Indo-Pacific.”

The statement, part of a broader push to expand NATO’s ties with partners in that region, is indicative of a significant shift for an alliance with such deep historical roots in the West. The strong Indo-Pacific focus at NATO’s recent summit in Washington, DC, also reflected the alliance’s evident determination to make the region an increasingly prominent element of a broader policy agenda. However, the realities of—and wisdom behind—such a shift remain less clear.

Beyond the Atlantic

NATO’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific is by no means a new phenomenon. The alliance has been involved in the region since the 1990s, collaborating on an ad hoc basis with states such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand (a grouping later referred to as the Indo-Pacific Four, or IP4). These partnerships typically developed in the context of larger multilateral efforts to combat transnational threats, particularly piracy. While sporadic and limited in scope, these interactions nevertheless allowed NATO states to gain experience working with counterparts in that region, paving the way for more substantive ties.

In 2022, NATO took the unprecedented step of inviting the IP4 to participate in its annual summit, then in Madrid. All the states sent their political leaders. That meeting culminated in the adoption of a new Strategic Concept, which for the first time mentioned the Indo-Pacific as a key area of focus for the alliance. Foreshadowing future messaging, the document emphasized the growing linkages between the Indo-Pacific and rest of the world, noting that “developments in the region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security”. This language was heavily influenced by the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine—then just a few months old—and the growing alignment between Russia and China. The Strategic Concept explicitly criticized Beijing for its efforts to erode norms and destabilize the international order, and specifically cited its approach to the war in Ukraine. Notably, NATO conducted its first formal discussions on China’s threat to Taiwan later that year, a striking step for an institution that had previously been reluctant to even mention China.

This more expansive focus continued to develop in 2023, when the alliance again invited the IP4 to participate in its annual summit, this time in Vilnius. In the joint communiqué issued after the meeting, NATO officials reiterated their commitment to expanding ties in the Indo-Pacific and noted the growing convergence in the interests of NATO states and the IP4. Continuing the combative tone of the 2022 Strategic Concept, the 2023 communiqué reprimanded China for contributing to global instability, reserving particular criticism for Beijing’s support for Moscow.

No Retreat

It is unsurprising, therefore, that NATO’s 2024 summit was a similarly international affair. The IP4 states attended, all but one sending a prime minister or president. Australia sent its deputy prime minster. The alliance struck a positive tone in welcoming the Asian partners back, but an undeniable air of anxiety pervaded the proceedings as each Indo-Pacific leader brought news of troubling regional developments. Discussions made clear that the war in Ukraine, and the authoritarian alignment that has accompanied it, had raised alarm bells across the region. Fears of a potentially devastating Indo-Pacific conflict have grown.

Instead of retreating from these distant challenges, NATO intends to expand the more internationalized outlook that it has developed in recent years. A succinct sentence in the opening paragraphs of the Washington summit declaration makes that clear: “The threats we face are global and interconnected.” As the declaration repeatedly notes, developments beyond the alliance’s borders can no longer be ignored. While war is raging in Europe, steady flows of materiel and financial and logistical support from China, North Korea and Iran exacerbate and prolong the conflict. This realization echoes throughout the declaration.

In response, the alliance and its Indo-Pacific partners agreed to a suite of initiatives designed to broaden and institutionalize cooperation. These efforts will be centered around four “flagship projects” focused on “support to Ukraine; cyber defense; exchanging information on the challenges posed by disinformation; and artificial intelligence”. Summit attendees also reignited discussions on establishing a liaison office in Tokyo, a notion first proposed at their 2023 gathering. These ambitions remain largely theoretical now, but NATO’s messaging suggests that they are intended to form the foundation of a considerably more substantive relationship.

Discussion Meets Reality

Though many welcome expanded NATO-Indo-Pacific engagement, the alliance, despite its considerable military and economic might, can ill afford to overextend itself. This is particularly true as the Russian invasion of Ukraine demands much attention and, barring a collapse of one warring side or the other, will continue to monopolize alliance resources for the foreseeable future. That and the long-standing reluctance of many European NATO member states to invest in Indo-Pacific security likely make the establishment of any meaningful NATO presence in the region challenging.

Beyond this, the shadow of the U.S. election looms large over the alliance. Donald Trump has not openly called for American withdrawal from NATO, but he has repeatedly attacked it and its member states for failing to meet the obligation to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense. His return to the White House, given the United States’ critical role as an alliance funder, supplier and organizer, could have massive implications. Should Trump choose to distance the U.S. from NATO, either by withdrawing from it or reducing funding, the alliance would be forced to confront potentially existential questions. NATO leaders have repeatedly stated that they are fully prepared to push forward with reduced American involvement, but it is unlikely that such a scenario would allow the Indo-Pacific to remain a priority.

Seizing the Opportunity

Notwithstanding these sizable challenges, NATO’s growing engagement with the Indo-Pacific should be welcomed rather than discouraged. The four flagship projects that emerged from the 2024 summit are realistic and timely, and could prove beneficial for all involved. In the coming years, NATO leaders should work to further solidify the alliance’s Indo-Pacific relationships, possibly by establishing more than one liaison office in the region and formalizing cooperative efforts on shared interests. Both would require only limited investments of time and resources.

Full-fledged NATO involvement in the Indo-Pacific remains unlikely in the near term. Still, the region is an undoubtedly valuable source of expertise, intelligence and experience. The alliance will be all the stronger if it can benefit from these assets while maintaining its focus on the Euro-Atlantic.

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