Pianissimo:

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, once heralded as a danger to EU cohesion, has become Brussels’ favored bridge-builder.

In a shock for pro-EU forces, the self-proclaimed admirer of Benito Mussolini and leader of a party with neofascist roots has turned out to be less of a bomb-thrower than expected at the European level. Domestically, though, her populist politics run deep.

Since her 2022 election, Meloni has overseen a campaign against press freedom. She has frequently sued journalists who criticize her and eroded the independence of state broadcaster RAI. She is also accused of using spyware against investigative journalists. Her actions, however, are not confined to the media. In response to multiple court rulings that blocked her migration policies for human rights violations, she has publicly attacked judges and launched a constitutional reform process that would weaken the judiciary’s independence. On top of that, she has moved to amend the Italian constitution to automatically give the top party in each national election a legislative majority, no matter how small the margin. The amendment would also strip the president of the authority to dissolve parliament and name prime ministers. Combined, these changes would cement minority rule and remove most checks on executive power.

The European Commission has been mostly silent about Rome’s democratic erosion. While the 2024 Commission Rule of Law Report did criticize Italy’s declining media freedom, the country has not faced the same threats of funding freezes or Council voting restrictions that Slovakia and Hungary have for their backsliding. In fact, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was accused of delaying the release of the report to avoid antagonizing Meloni ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.

Von der Leyen’s reluctance to needle Meloni before that vote provides a clue to one primary reason for the Commission’s avoidance of scrutinizing Italy: strategic alliances. Rome’s Mediterranean-oriented foreign policy, combined with the salience of migration for an ever-growing European far right, has positioned the prime minister as the ideal interlocutor between North Africa and Europe. Italy’s Mattei Plan, an investment scheme launched in 2023 that aims to strengthen African institutions and economic development, demonstrates the country’s south-facing foreign policy. Meloni’s role as Mediterranean matriarch was made clear when she facilitated a migration agreement between Tunisia and the EU, and subsequently hosted von der Leyen on Lampedusa, an Italian island home to a migrant camp.

Beyond mediation, Meloni’s policy of relocating asylum seekers to third-country processing centers, primarily in Albania, is the blueprint for the Commission’s latest migration proposals. Last month, the EU executive officially endorsed the Italian government’s plans in a case before the European Court of Justice. This support comes despite criticism from human rights organizations and three Italian court rulings against the plan on humanitarian grounds. Brussels clearly sees Rome as a necessary partner for negotiating migration deals and reshaping policy. Clinging to Meloni may give the Commission more credibility among the anti-immigration right, but it sacrifices the EU’s commitment to human rights and democratic values.

Italy, for its part, has exploited its role as the Commission’s intermediary to make itself indispensable to Brussels on both sides of the Atlantic. When fellow far-right leader Viktor Orbán of Hungary sought to block Ukraine aid packages, Meloni played mediator and sealed the deal. And she emerged as a translator between Europe and Donald Trump after his reelection by leveraging her personal ties to the U.S. president and Elon Musk. In short, Meloni strategically lends her far-right credibility to the Commission in exchange for Brussels ignoring Rome’s democratic transgressions.

Meloni’s strategy is not without risks. Italy is economically dependent on the Commission’s Recovery and Resilience Plan for implementation of many of the prime minister’s signature initiatives. These same resources were previously frozen for Hungary and Poland over rule-of-law concerns. If Italy fails to deliver on migration and populist mediation, the 37% of the money that has yet to be disbursed could be withheld. Still, the odds of a collapse of the relationship between Rome and Brussels before all funds are distributed are low.

Ultimately, it is the Commission that stands to lose in the long run. The first danger is the normalization of migration policies that run counter to the EU’s foundational principle of respect for human dignity. Meloni, despite the judicial setbacks that she has faced at home over human rights violations, is now in the driver’s seat for the EU’s entire approach to migration. The second risk is the normalization of quid-pro-quo democratic backsliding in the bloc. Today’s Italy provides a playbook for aspiring authoritarians to make themselves useful to Brussels on strategic issues to escape criticism and punishment for domestic actions. The Commission may set a precedent for the EU to stop taking democracy seriously if it does not confront Rome’s backsliding. Lastly, there is a real risk that the EU could sacrifice its values for nothing. Credibility is not easily transferrable, and far-right supporters are unlikely to become friendlier to traditional parties or the EU due to a rightward shift on immigration. Instead, the Commission’s alliance with Meloni is more likely to fuel the rise of the far right by legitimizing its rhetoric and policies. The Commission may achieve short-term wins, but democracy could be the long-term loss.

Print